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In a standard Bayesian approach to the alpha-factor model for common-cause failure, a precise Dirichlet
prior distribution models epistemic uncertainty in the alpha-factors. This Dirichlet prior is then updated
with observed data to obtain a posterior distribution, which forms the basis for further inferences.
In this paper, we adapt the imprecise Dirichlet model of Walley to represent epistemic uncertainty in
the alpha-factors. In this approach, epistemic uncertainty is expressed more cautiously via lower and
upper expectations for each alpha-factor, along with a learning parameter which determines how quickly
the model learns from observed data. For this application, we focus on elicitation of the learning
parameter, and ﬁnd that values in the range of 1 to 10 seem reasonable. The approach is compared with
Kelly and Atwood's minimally informative Dirichlet prior for the alpha-factor model, which incorporated
precise mean values for the alpha-factors, but which was otherwise quite diffuse.
Next, we explore the use of a set of Gamma priors to model epistemic uncertainty in the marginal failure
rate, expressed via a lower and upper expectation for this rate, again along with a learning parameter. As zero
counts are generally less of an issue here, we ﬁnd that the choice of this learning parameter is less crucial.
Finally, we demonstrate how both epistemic uncertainty models can be combined to arrive at lower
and upper expectations for all common-cause failure rates. Thereby, we effectively provide a full
sensitivity analysis of common-cause failure rates, properly reﬂecting epistemic uncertainty of the
analyst on all levels of the common-cause failure model.
& 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Common-cause failure has been recognized since the time of the
Reactor Safety Study [1] as a dominant contributor to the unrelia-
bility of redundant systems. A number of models have been devel-
oped for common-cause failure over the time since the publication of
the Reactor Safety Study, with perhaps the most widely used one
being the Basic Parameter Model, at least in the U.S. [2].
The alpha-factor parameterization of this model uses a multi-
nomial distribution as its aleatory model for observed failures [2].
The conjugate prior to the multinomial model is the Dirichlet
distribution. In the standard Bayesian approach, the analyst
speciﬁes the parameters of a precise Dirichlet distribution to
model epistemic uncertainty in the alpha-factors, which are the
parameters of the multinomial aleatory model. This Dirichlet priorr Ltd.
,
Open access under CC BY license.is then updated with observed data to obtain a precise posterior
distribution, also Dirichlet.
In this paper, we follow Troffaes et al. [3], and adapt the
imprecise Dirichlet model of Walley [4] to represent epistemic
uncertainty in the alpha-factors. In this approach the analyst
speciﬁes lower or upper expectations (or both) for each alpha-
factor, along with a learning parameter, which determines how
quickly the prior distribution learns from observed data. As the
meaning of this learning parameter is less tangible, we discuss
reasonable values for the learning parameter in this application.
Following Troffaes et al. [3], the approach is compared with that
of Kelly and Atwood [5], which attempted to ﬁnd a precise Dirichlet
prior that was minimally informative [6], in the sense that it
incorporated speciﬁed mean values for the alpha-factors, but which
was otherwise quite diffuse. The numerical example from Kelly and
Atwood [5] is addressed in the imprecise Dirichlet framework,
which can be seen as an extension of their approach to the case
where a precise mean for each alpha-factor cannot be speciﬁed.
Finally, we address the problem – not discussed in Troffaes
et al. [3] – of inference about actual failure rates. These failure rates
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rate per component. Modelling failures as a Poisson process, we
take a Gamma distribution as conjugate prior for the marginal
failure rate. Similar to the procedure for the alpha-factors, we can
model epistemic uncertainty on the marginal failure rate by
considering lower and upper expected prior failure rates, along
with a learning parameter that determines how quickly the prior
distribution learns from observed data.
By combining our epistemic uncertainty models for both the
alpha-factors and the marginal failure rate, we are able to perform
a global sensitivity analysis on the common-cause failure rates.
We provide an algorithm that calculates, up to reasonable preci-
sion, bounds on these failure rates. The resulting novel procedure
is demonstrated on a simple electrical network reliability problem.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the basic
parameter model and its reparameterization as the alpha-factor
model. Section 3 explores how the parameters of the alpha-factor
model can be estimated, using Dirichlet and Gamma priors.
Section 4 discusses the handling of epistemic uncertainty for the
alpha-factors. Two ways to choose a Dirichlet prior (or sets of
Dirichlet priors) starting from epistemic prior expectations of the
alpha-factors are considered. Throughout, the main ideas are
demonstrated on a numerical example. Section 5 shows how,
similarly to the alpha-factor case, epistemic uncertainty can be
expressed for the marginal failure rate. A set of conjugate Gamma
priors is elicited by considering lower and upper expected prior
marginal failure rates. Section 6 describes an algorithm that infers
bounds on all common-cause failure rates based on our imprecise
alpha-factor model and our imprecise marginal failure rate model.
Section 7 demonstrates our methodology on a simple electrical
network reliability problem. Section 8 ends the paper with some
conclusions and thoughts for further research.2. Common-cause failure modelling
2.1. The basic parameter model
Consider a system that consists of k components. Throughout,
we make the following standard assumptions: (i) repair is
immediate, and (ii) failures follow a Poisson process.
For simplicity, we assume that all k components are exchange-
able, in the sense that they have identical failure rates. More
precisely, we assume that all events involving exactly j compo-
nents failing have the same failure rate, which we denote by qj.
This model is called the basic parameter model [2], and we write q
for ðq1;…; qkÞ.
For example, if we have three components, A, B, and C, then the
rate at which we see only A failing is equal to the rate at which we
see only B failing, and is also equal to the rate at which we see only
C failing; this failure rate is q1. Moreover, the rate at which we
observe only A and B jointly failing is equal to the rate at which we
observe only B and C jointly failing, and also equal to the rate at
which we observe only A and C jointly failing; this failure rate is q2.
The rate at which we see all three components jointly failing is q3.
In case of k identical components without common-cause
failure modes, thus each failing independently at rate λ, we would
have1
q1 ¼ λ and qj ¼ 0 for j≥2: ð1Þ
The fact that we allow arbitrary values for the qj reﬂects the lack of
independence, and whence, our modelling of common-cause1 This is due to our Poisson assumption, and the assumption of immediate
repair: independent Poisson processes never generate events simultaneously when
we observe failure times precisely.failures. At this point, it is worth noting that we do not actually
write down a statistical model for all possible common-cause
failure modes—we could do so if this information was available,
and in fact, this could render the basic parameter model obsolete,
and allow for more detailed inferences. In essence, the basic
parameter model allows us to statistically model lack of indepen-
dence between component failures, without further detail as to
where dependencies arise from: all failure modes are lumped
together, so to speak.
It is useful to note that it is possible, and sometimes necessary,
to relax the exchangeability assumption to accommodate speciﬁc
asymmetric cases. For example, when components are in different
state of health, single failures would clearly not have identical
failure rates. A preliminary investigation of the asymmetric case,
for two components, can be found in Troffaes and Blake [7].
In a nutshell, the analysis is very similar, but the formulas become
somewhat more complicated because there are more variables
to keep track of. Therefore, we stick to the exchangeable case
here.
Clearly, to answer typical reliability questions, such as for
instance “what is the probability that two or more components
fail in the next month?”, we need q. In practice, the following three
issues commonly arise. First, q is rarely measured directly, as
failure data is often collected only per component. Secondly, when
direct data about joint failures is available, typically, this data is
sparse, because events involving more than two components
failing simultaneously are usually quite rare. Thirdly, there are
usually two distinct sources of failure data, one usually very large
data set related to failure per component, and one usually much
smaller data set related to joint failures. For these reasons, it is
sensible to reparameterize the model in terms of parameters that
can be more easily estimated, as follows.2.2. The alpha-factor model
The alpha-factor parameterization of the basic parameter
model [2] starts out with considering the total failure rate of a
component qt, which could involve failure of any number of
components, that is, this is the rate obtained by looking at just
one component, ignoring everything else. Clearly
qt ¼ ∑
k
j ¼ 1
k−1
j−1
 !
qj: ð2Þ
For example, again consider a three component system, A, B, and
C. The rate at which A fails is then the rate at which only A fails
(q1), plus the rate at which A and B, or A and C fail (2q2), plus the
rate at which all three components fail (q3).
Next, the alpha-factor model introduces αj – the so-called
alpha-factor – which denotes the probability of exactly j of the k
components failing given that failure occurs; in terms of relative
frequency, αj is the fraction of failures that involve exactly j failed
components. We write α for ðα1;…; αkÞ. Clearly
αj ¼
k
j
 !
qj
∑kℓ ¼ 1
k
ℓ
 
qℓ
: ð3Þ
For example, again consider A, B, and C. Then the rate at which
exactly one component fails is 3q1 (as we have three single
components, each of which failing with rate q1), the rate at which
exactly two components fail is 3q2 (as we have three combinations
of two components, each combination failing with rate q2), and
the rate at which all components fail is q3. Translating these rates
into fractions, we arrive precisely at Eq. (3).
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qj ¼
1
k−1
j−1
 ! jαj
∑kℓ ¼ 1ℓαℓ
qt : ð4Þ
Eqs. (2), (3), and (4) establish a one-to-one link between the
so-called basic parameter model (q) and the alpha-factor model
(qt, α). The beneﬁt of the alpha-factor model over the basic
parameter model lies in its distinction between the total failure
rate of a component qt, for which we generally have a lot of
information, and common-cause failures modeled by α, for which
we generally have very little information.
One of the goals of this paper is to perform a sensitivity
analysis, in the sense of robust Bayes [8–10], over α, and to
measure its effects on qj. Because the qj are proportional to qt, in
fact, it turns out to take only very little additional effort to perform
a sensitivity analysis over α and qt jointly. So, although in many
cases of practical interest, we will know qt quite well, interestingly,
we do not need to assume that we know much at all about qt.3. Parameter estimation
3.1. Dirichlet prior for alpha-factors
Suppose that we have observed a sequence of N failure events,
where we have counted the number of components involved with
each failure event, say nj of the N observed failure events involved
exactly j failed components. We write n for ðn1;…;nkÞ. In terms of
the alpha-factors, the likelihood for n has a very simple form:
PrðnjαÞ ¼ ∏
k
j ¼ 1
α
nj
j ; ð5Þ
which is a multinomial distribution with parameter α.
As mentioned already, typically, for j≥2, the nj are very low,
with zero being quite common for larger j. In such cases, standard
techniques such as maximum likelihood for estimating the alpha-
factors fail to produce sensible inferences. For any inference to be
reasonably possible, it has been recognized [2] that we have to rely
on epistemic information, that is, information which is not just
described by the data.
A standard way to include epistemic information in the model is
through speciﬁcation of a Dirichlet prior for the alpha-factors [2]:
f ðαjs; tÞ∝ ∏
k
j ¼ 1
α
stj−1
j ð6Þ
which is a conjugate prior for the multinomial likelihood speciﬁed in
Eq. (5). In Eq. (6), we use Walley's [10, Section 7.7.3, p. 395] ðs; tÞ
notation for the hyperparameters. Here, s40 and t∈Δ, where Δ is the
ðk−1Þdimensional unit simplex:
Δ¼ ðt1;…; tkÞ : t1≥0;…; tk≥0; ∑
k
j ¼ 1
tj ¼ 1
( )
ð7Þ
An interpretation for these parameters will be given shortly. First, let
us calculate the posterior density for α:
f ðαjn; s; tÞ∝ ∏
k
j ¼ 1
α
stjþnj−1
j : ð8Þ
Of typical interest is for instance the posterior expectation of
the probability αj of observing j of the k components failing due to2 Hint: consider ∑kj ¼ 1jαj .a common cause given that failure occurs:
Eðαjjn; s; tÞ ¼
Z
Δ
αjf ðαjn; s; tÞ dα¼
nj þ stj
N þ s
¼ N
N þ s
nj
N
þ s
N þ s tj ð9Þ
where N¼∑kj ¼ 1nj is the total number of observations.
Eq. (9) provides the usual well-known interpretation for the
hyperparameters s and t:hypIf N¼0, then Eðαjjs; tÞ ¼ tj, so tj is the prior expected chance of
observing j of the k components failing due to a common cause,
given that failure occurs. Eðαjjn; s; tÞ is a weighted average of tj and nj=N (the proportion
of j-component failures in the N observations), with weights s
and N, respectively. The parameter s thus determines how
much data is required for the posterior to start moving away
from the prior. If N⪡s then the prior will weigh more; if N¼s,
then prior and data will weigh equally; and if N⪢s, then the
data will weigh more. In particular, Eðαjjn; s; tÞ ¼ tj if N¼0 (as
already mentioned), and Eðαj n; s; tÞ- njN
 as N-∞.
For inference about qj, which we will discuss in Section 6, we
will also need, for natural numbers p1, …, pk, with P≔∑kj ¼ 1pj:
E ∏
k
j ¼ 1
α
pj
j jn; s; t
 !
¼
∏kj ¼ 1ðnj þ stjÞpj
ðN þ sÞP
: ð10Þ
where ðxÞn, for n∈N0, denotes the raising factorial, also known as
Pochhammer's symbol [11, 6.1.22, p. 256]:
ðxÞn≔
Γðxþ nÞ
ΓðxÞ ¼ ðxþ n−1Þðxþ n−2Þ…ðxþ 1Þx: ð11Þ
By linearity of expectation, Eq. (10) allows us to calculate the
expectation of an arbitrary polynomial in α.
3.2. Per component failure rate
Now we turn to the estimation of qt, the total failure rate per
component. As mentioned at the start of Section 2, we assume that
failures follow a Poisson process. Suppose we observeM failures of
our component over a time interval of length T. If M is sufﬁciently
large, then a reasonable point estimate for qt would be M=T .
Often, that will be enough. However, in case M is not terribly
large, we can easily propose a conjugate prior for qt. Speciﬁcally,
the likelihood for M, given T, is
PrðMjqt ; TÞ ¼
ðqtTÞMe−qtT
M!
ð12Þ
which is simply a Poisson distribution with parameter qtT .
A standard way to include epistemic information in the model
is through speciﬁcation of a Gamma prior [12,13]3:
f ðqt ju; vÞ∝quv−1t e−qtu; ð13Þ
which is a conjugate prior for the Poisson likelihood speciﬁed in
Eq. (12). The posterior density for qt is
f ðqt jM; T ;u; vÞ∝quvþM−1t e−qt ðuþTÞ ð14Þ
Of typical interest is the posterior expectation of qt:
Eðqt jM; T ;u; vÞ ¼
Z
u;v
f ðqt jM; T ;u; vÞ du dv¼
M þ uv
uþ T
¼ T
uþ T
M
T
þ u
uþ T v ð15Þ3 We use a non-standard parameterization to allow easier interpretation of the
erparameters.
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hyperparameters u and v, which mimics our discussion concern-
ing the Dirichlet prior4:of tIf T¼0, then Eðqt ju; vÞ ¼ v, so v is the prior expected failure rate. Eðqt jM; T ;u; vÞ is a weighted average of v and M=T (the empiri-
cal observed failure rate), with weights u and T, respectively.
The parameter u thus determines for how long we need to
observe the process until the posterior starts to move away
from the prior. If T⪡u then the prior will weigh more; if T¼u,
then prior and data will weigh equally; and if T⪢u, then the
data will weigh more. In particular, Eðqt jM; T ;u; vÞ ¼ v if T¼0 (as
already mentioned), and Eðqt jM; T ;u; vÞ-M=T as T-∞.
4. Handling epistemic uncertainty in alpha-factors
Crucial to reliable inference in the alpha-factor model is proper
modelling of epistemic uncertainty about failures, which is in the
above approach expressed through the ðs; tÞ parameters. We focus
on two methods for elicitation of these parameters, and the
inferences that result from them.
Throughout, we will use the following example, which is taken
from Kelly and Atwood [5]. Consider a systemwith four redundant
components (k¼4). The probability of j out of k failures, given that
failure has happened, was denoted by αj. We assume that the
analyst's prior expectation μspec;j for each αj is
μspec;1 ¼ 0:950 μspec;2 ¼ 0:030
μspec;3 ¼ 0:015 μspec;4 ¼ 0:005 ð16Þ
We have 36 observations, in which 35 showed one component
failing, and 1 showed two components failing:
n1 ¼ 35 n2 ¼ 1 n3 ¼ 0 n4 ¼ 0
4.1. Constrained non-informative prior
Atwood [6] studied priors for the binomial model which max-
imize entropy (and whence, are ‘non-informative’) whilst constrain-
ing the mean to a speciﬁc value. Although these priors are not
conjugate, Atwood [6] showed that they can be well approximated by
Beta distributions, which are conjugate. Kelly and Atwood [5] applied
this approach to the multinomial model with conjugate Dirichlet
priors, by choosing a constrained non-informative prior for the
marginals of the Dirichlet—which are Beta. This leads to an over-
speciﬁed system of equalities, which can be solved via least-squares
optimization.
For the problem we are interested in, μspec;1 is close to 1. In this
case, the solution of the least-squares problem turns out to be
close to
tj ¼ μspec;j for all j∈ 1;…; k
 
s¼ 1
2ð1−μspec;1Þ
ð17Þ
For our example, this means that s¼10 [5, p. 400, Section 3].
An obvious calculation reveals that, under this prior [5, p. 401,
Section 3.1]:
Eðα1jn; s; tÞ ¼
35þ 9:5
36þ 10 ¼ 0:967 Eðα2jn; s; tÞ ¼
1þ 0:3
36þ 10 ¼ 0:028
Eðα3jn; s; tÞ ¼
0þ 0:15
36þ 10 ¼ 0:003 Eðα4jn; s; tÞ ¼
0þ 0:05
36þ 10 ¼ 0:0014 In fact, we arrive at similar interpretations because both priors are members
he canonical exponential family [12,13].Kelly and Atwood [5, p. 402, Section 4] compare these results
against a large number of other choices of priors, and note that the
posterior resulting from Eq. (17) seems too strongly inﬂuenced by
the prior, particularly in the presence of zero counts. For instance,
the uniform prior is a Dirichlet distribution with hyperparameters
tj¼0.25 and s¼4, which gives:
Eðα1jn; s; tÞ ¼
35þ 1
36þ 4 ¼ 0:9 Eðα2jn; s; tÞ ¼
1þ 1
36þ 4 ¼ 0:05
Eðα3jn; s; tÞ ¼
0þ 1
36þ 4 ¼ 0:025 Eðα4jn; s; tÞ ¼
0þ 1
36þ 4 ¼ 0:025
Jeffrey's prior is again a Dirichlet distribution with hyperpara-
meters tj¼0.125 and s¼4, which gives:
Eðα1jn; s; tÞ ¼
35þ 0:5
36þ 4 ¼ 0:8875 Eðα2jn; s; tÞ ¼
1þ 0:5
36þ 4 ¼ 0:0375
Eðα3jn; s; tÞ ¼
0þ 0:5
36þ 4 ¼ 0:0125 Eðα4jn; s; tÞ ¼
0þ 0:5
36þ 4 ¼ 0:0125
The degree of variation in the posterior under different priors is
evidently somewhat alarming. In the next section, we aim to
robustify the model by using sets of priors from the start.
4.2. Imprecise Dirichlet model
4.2.1. Near-ignorance model
In case no prior information is available, Walley proposes as a
so-called near-ignorance prior a set of Dirichlet priors, with
hyperparameters constrained to the set:
H¼ fðs; tÞ : t∈Δg
for some ﬁxed value of s, which determines the learning speed of
the model [10, p. 218, Section 5.3.2] [4, p. 9, Section 2.3].
4.2.2. General model
When prior information is available, more generally, we may
assume that we can specify a subset H of ð0;þ∞Þ  Δ. Following
Walley's suggestions [10, p. 224, Section 5.4.3] [4, p. 32, Section 6],
we take
H¼ fðs; tÞ : s∈½s; s; t∈Δ; tj∈½t j; t jg ð18Þ
where the analyst has to specify the bounds ½t j; t j for each
j∈ff1;…; kgg, and ½s; s.
The posterior lower and upper expectations of αj are
Eðαjjn;HÞ ¼min
nj þ st j
N þ s ;
nj þ st j
N þ s
( )
¼
nj þ st j
N þ s if t j≥nj=N
nj þ st j
N þ s if t j≤nj=N
8>><
>>:
ð19Þ
Eðαjjn;HÞ ¼max
nj þ st j
N þ s ;
nj þ st j
N þ s
 
¼
nj þ st j
N þ s if t j≥nj=N
nj þ st j
N þ s if t j ≤nj=N
8>><
>>:
ð20Þ
For the model to be of any use, we must be able to elicit the
bounds. The interval ½t j; t j simply represents bounds on the prior
expectation of the chance αj.
Fixed learning parameter: Typically, the learning parameter s is
taken to be 2 (not without controversy; see insightful discussions
in [4]). One might therefore be tempted to using the same prior
expectations tj for the αj as above (Eq. (16)), with s¼2, resulting in
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Eðα1jn; s; tÞ ¼
35þ 1:9
36þ 2 ¼ 0:971 Eðα2jn; s; tÞ ¼
1þ 0:06
36þ 2 ¼ 0:028
Eðα3jn; s; tÞ ¼
0þ 0:03
36þ 2 ¼ 0:0007 Eðα4jn; s; tÞ ¼
0þ 0:01
36þ 2 ¼ 0:0002
Whence, for this example, it is obvious that s¼2 is an excessively
poor choice: the posterior expectations in case of zero counts are
pulled way too much toward zero. One might suspect that this is
partly due to the strong prior information, that is, the knowledge
of tj. However, even if we interpret the given probabilities as
bounds, say:
½t1; t1 ¼ ½0:950;1 ð21aÞ
½t2; t2 ¼ ½0;0:030 ð21bÞ
½t3; t3 ¼ ½0;0:015 ð21cÞ
½t4; t4 ¼ ½0;0:005 ð21dÞ
we still ﬁnd:
½Eðα1jn;HÞ; Eðα1jn;HÞ ¼ ½0:971;0:974 ð22aÞ
½Eðα2jn;HÞ; Eðα2jn;HÞ ¼ ½0:026;0:028 ð22bÞ
½Eðα3jn;HÞ; Eðα3jn;HÞ ¼ ½0;0:0007 ð22cÞ
½Eðα4jn;HÞ; Eðα4jn;HÞ ¼ ½0;0:0002 ð22dÞ
Clearly, only the posterior inferences about α1 (and perhaps also α2)
seem reasonable. We conclude that the imprecise Dirichlet model with
s¼2 learns too fast from the data in case of zero counts.
On the one hand, when counts are sufﬁciently far from zero,
the posterior probability with s¼2, and perhaps even s¼1 or s¼0,
seem appropriate. For zero counts, however, a larger value of
s seems mandatory. Therefore, it seems logical to pick an interval
for s.
A further argument for choosing an interval for s, in case of an
informative set of priors, is provided by Walley [10, p. 225, Section
5.4.4]: a larger value of s ensures that the posterior does not move
away too fast from the prior, which is particularly important for
zero counts, and the difference between s and s effectively results
in greater posterior imprecision if nj=N∉½t j; t j.
To see this, note that, if t j ≤nj=N ≤t j, it follows from Eqs. (19)
and (20) that both lower and upper posterior expectation are
calculated using s. When nj=N ≤t j (or t j ≤nj=N), the lower (upper)
posterior expectation is calculated using s instead, which is nearer
to nj=N due to the lower weight s for the prior bound t j (t jÞ. The
increased imprecision reﬂects the conﬂict between the prior
assignment ½t j; t j and the observed fraction nj=N, and this is
referred to as prior-data conﬂict (also see [14]).
Interval for Learning Parameter: We follow Good [15, p. 19] (as
suggested by Walley [10, Note 5.4.1, p. 524)], and reason about
posterior expectations of hypothetical data to elicit s and s; also
see [10, p. 219, Section 5.3.3] for further discussion on elicitation
on s—our approach is similar, but simpler for the case under study.
We assume that t1 ¼ 1 and t j ¼ 0 for all j≥2.
The upper probability of multiple (j≥2) failed components in
trial mþ 1, given one (j¼1) failed component in all of the ﬁrst m
trials, is
Eðαjjn1 ¼m;N¼m;HÞ ¼
st j
mþ s
(Note: there is no prior-data conﬂict in this case.) Whence, for the
above probability to reduce to t j=2 (i.e., to reduce the prior upperprobability by half), we need that m¼ s. In other words, s is the
number of one-component failures required to reduce the upper
probabilities of multi-components failure by half.
Conversely, the lower probability of one (j¼1) failed compo-
nent in trial mþ 1, given only multiple (j≥2) failed components in
the ﬁrst m trials, is
Eðα1jn1 ¼ 0;N¼m;HÞ ¼
st1
mþ s
(Note: there is strong prior-data conﬂict in this case.) In other
words, s is the number of multi-component failures required to
reduce the lower probability of one-component failure by half. Note
that, in this case, a few alternative interpretations present them-
selves. First, for j≥2,
Eðαjjnj ¼m;N¼m;HÞ ¼
mþ st j
mþ s
In other words, s is also the number of j-component failures required
to increase the upper probability of j components failing to ð1þ t jÞ=2
(generally, this will be close to 12, provided that t j is close to zero).
Secondly, for j≥2,
Eðαjjnj ¼m;N¼m;HÞ ¼
m
mþ s
so s is also the number of multi-component failures required to
increase the lower probability of multi-component failures to a half.
Any of these counts seem well suited for elicitation, and are
easy to interpret. As a guideline, we suggest the following easily
remembered rules: s is the number of one-component failures required to reduce
the upper probabilities of multi-component failures by
half, and s is the number of multi-component failures required to reduce
the lower probability of one-component failures by half.
Taking the above interpretation, the difference between s and s
reﬂects the fact that the rate at which we reduce upper probabil-
ities is less than the rate at which we reduce lower probabilities,
and thus reﬂects a level of caution in our model.
Coming back to our example, reasonable values are s ¼ 1 (if we
immediately observe multi-component failures, we might be quite
keen to reduce our lower probability for one-component failure)
and s ¼ 10 (we are happy to halve our upper probabilities of multi-
component failures after observing 10 one-component failures).
With these values, when taking for tj the values given in Eq. (16),
we ﬁnd the following posterior lower and upper expectations
of αj:
½Eðα1jn;HÞ; Eðα1jn;HÞ ¼ ½0:967;0:972 ð23aÞ
½Eðα2jn;HÞ; Eðα2jn;HÞ ¼ ½0:0278;0:0283 ð23bÞ
½Eðα3jn;HÞ; Eðα3jn;HÞ ¼ ½0:00041;0:00326 ð23cÞ
½Eðα4jn;HÞ; Eðα4jn;HÞ ¼ ½0:00014;0:00109 ð23dÞ
These bounds indeed reﬂect caution in inferences where zero
counts have occurred (j¼3 and j¼4), with upper expectations
considerably larger as compared to the model with ﬁxed s, while
still giving a reasonable expectation interval for the probability of
one-component failure.
If we desire to specify our initial bounds for tj more conserva-
tively, as in Eq. (21), we ﬁnd similar results:
½Eðα1jn;HÞ; Eðα1jn;HÞ ¼ ½0:967;0:978 ð24aÞ
½Eðα2jn;HÞ; Eðα2jn;HÞ ¼ ½0:0270;0:0283 ð24bÞ
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½Eðα4jn;HÞ; Eðα4jn;HÞ ¼ ½0;0:00109 ð24dÞTable 1
Accuracy of ﬁrst and second order Taylor approximations.
x 1
1þx 1−x 1−xþ x2
0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
0.1 0.91 0.9 0.91
0.2 0.83 0.8 0.84
0.3 0.77 0.7 0.79
0.4 0.71 0.6 0.76
0.5 0.67 0.5 0.75
0.6 0.63 0.4 0.76
0.7 0.59 0.3 0.79
0.8 0.56 0.2 0.84
0.9 0.53 0.1 0.915. Handling epistemic uncertainty in marginal failure rate
Before we can consider inferences on the common-cause failure
rates qj, we will brieﬂy explain howwe express epistemic uncertainty
on the marginal failure rate qt. As seen in Section 3.2, we will use
conjugate Gamma priors with hyperparameters u and v, where v is
the prior failure rate parameter, and u determines the learning speed.
Similarly to the alpha-factor case, we can express vague prior
information on qt by considering sets of priors, which are generated
by sets of hyperparameters, i.e., we specify a parameter set
JD ð0; ∞Þ  ð0; ∞Þ. Unlike Section 4.2.1, here J ¼ fug  ð0; ∞Þ, for some
ﬁxed value of u, does not lead to a practically useful near-ignorant set
of priors, as then Eðqt jM; T ;J Þ ¼ ∞ for any M and T. In practice, it
should not be a big issue to ﬁnd bounds ½v; v for the prior expected
marginal failure rate.
Similarly to Eqs. (19) and (20), when J ¼ ½u;u  ½v; v, the
posterior lower and upper expectations of qt are
Eðqt jM; T ;J Þ ¼min
M þ uv
T þ u ;
M þ uv
T þ u
 
¼
M þ uv
T þ u if v≥M=T
M þ uv
T þ u if v ≤M=T
8>><
>>:
ð25Þ
Eðqt jM; T ;J Þ ¼max
M þ uv
T þ u ;
M þ uv
T þ u
 
¼
M þ uv
T þ u if v≥M=T
M þ uv
T þ v if v ≤M=T
8>><
>>:
ð26Þ
To elicit bounds for the learning parameter u, similar consid-
erations as in Section 4.2.2 can be made. Assuming v ¼ 0, the
posterior lower expectation for qt is
Eðqt jM; T ;J Þ ¼
M
T þ u ð27Þ
(Note: there is no prior-data conﬂict in this case.) Whence, u is the
amount of time needed to observe the process until we raise the
lower expectation of qt from 0 to half of the observed failure rate
M=T .
Conversely, assuming v40, and no failures at all during time T,
the posterior lower expectation for qt is
Eðqt jM ¼ 0; T ;J Þ ¼
uv
T þ u ¼
v
T
u þ 1
ð28Þ
(Note: prior-data conﬂict is present in this case.) Whence, u is the
time needed to observe the process – without any failures – until v
is reduced by half.
Contrary to the situation in Section 4, zero counts are much less
of a concern when estimating the marginal failure rate. Whence,
for sake of simplicity, it might therefore sufﬁce to consider
parameter sets of the form
J ¼ uf g  ½v; v ð29Þ
only. Both Eqs. (27) and (28) can then serve to determine
u¼ u ¼ u.
A numerical example will be given in Section 7.6. Inference on failure rates
6.1. Expected failure rates
For inference on the failure rates qj, we will now combine our
models for alpha-factors and marginal failure rate by using Eq. (4).
The problem in doing this is that there is, as far as we know, no
immediate closed expression for the posterior expectation of qj,
because Eq. (4) is a rational function of α. However, naively, we can
approximate it using Taylor expansion. Speciﬁcally
qj ¼
1
k−1
j−1
 ! jαj
∑kℓ ¼ 1ℓαℓ
qt ð30Þ
¼ 1
k−1
j−1
 ! jαj
∑kℓ ¼ 1ðαℓ þ ðℓ−1ÞαℓÞ
qt ð31Þ
¼ 1
k−1
j−1
 ! jαj
1þ∑kℓ ¼ 2ðℓ−1Þαℓ
qt ð32Þ
and, as long as ∑kℓ ¼ 2ðℓ−1Þαℓo1—this is always true if k≤2; for
larger k, it is usually true because αℓ is usually very small for ℓ≥3—
we can use the Taylor expansion 1=ð1þ xÞ ¼ 1−xþ x2−x3 þ⋯
(valid for jxjo1), to arrive at
qj ¼
1
k−1
j−1
 ! jαj 1− ∑k
ℓ ¼ 2
ðℓ−1Þαℓ þ ∑
k
ℓ ¼ 2
ðℓ−1Þαℓ
( )2
−⋯
2
4
3
5qt ð33Þ
The posterior expectation of Eq. (33) can now be evaluated, using
Eqs. (10) and (15), under the usual assumption that qt is indepen-
dent of the alpha-factors.
To get a better idea of accuracy, Table 1 tabulates ﬁrst and
second order approximations. For example, second order approx-
imation remains fairly accurate for ∑kℓ ¼ 2ðℓ−1Þαℓo0:5, and ﬁrst
order approximation for ∑kℓ ¼ 2ðℓ−1Þαℓo0:3.
An obvious issue with Taylor approximation is that the domain
of integration includes values for α where the Taylor series does
not converge. However, it is easy to see that, for any x≥0 (not just
those for which jxjo1Þ:
0≤ ð1−xþ x2−⋯þ ð−xÞpÞ− 1
1þ x ≤x
pþ1
for even p; and ð34Þ
0≤
1
1þ x−ð1−xþ x
2−⋯þ ð−xÞpÞ≤xpþ1
for odd p: ð35Þ
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0≤E½yð1−xþ x2−⋯þ ð−xÞpÞ
−E
y
1þ x
 
≤Eðyxpþ1Þ
for even p; and ð36Þ
0≤E
y
1þ x
 
−E½yð1−xþ x2−⋯þ ð−xÞpÞ
≤Eðyxpþ1Þ
for odd p: ð37Þ
So as long as the expectation of yxpþ1 is small enough, taking the
expectation over the Taylor expansion, of order p, will provide a
reasonable approximation.
As an example, for the special but important case of k¼2, we
derive expressions for the posterior expectation of q1 and q2,
under second order approximation, along with error term:
Eðq1jn; s; t;M; T ;u; vÞ ð38Þ
≈Eðα1½1−α2 þ α22jn; s; tÞEðqt jM; T ;u; vÞ ð39Þ
¼ n1 þ st1
N þ s −
ðn1 þ st1Þ1ðn2 þ st2Þ1
ðN þ sÞ2

þ ðn1 þ st1Þ1ðn2 þ st2Þ2ðN þ sÞ3

M þ uv
uþ T ð40Þ
¼ n1 þ st1
N þ s 1−
n2 þ st2
N þ sþ 1 1−
n2 þ st2 þ 1
N þ sþ 2
  
M þ uv
uþ T ð41Þ
up to an absolute expected error less than
Eðα1α32 n; s; tÞEðqt M; T ;u; vÞ

¼ ðn1 þ st1Þðn2 þ st2Þðn2 þ st2 þ 1Þðn2 þ st2 þ 2ÞðN þ sÞðN þ sþ 1ÞðN þ sþ 2ÞðN þ sþ 3Þ
M þ uv
uþ T ð42Þ
and similarly,
Eðq2jn; s; t;M; T ;u; vÞ ð43Þ
≈Eð2α2½1−α2 þ α22jn; s; tÞEðqt jM; T ;u; vÞ ð44Þ
¼ 2 n2 þ st2
N þ s −
ðn2 þ st2Þ2
ðN þ sÞ2
þ ðn2 þ st2Þ3ðN þ sÞ3
 
M þ uv
uþ T ð45Þ
¼ 2n2 þ st2
N þ s 1−
n2 þ st2 þ 1
N þ sþ 1 1−
n2 þ st2 þ 2
N þ sþ 2
  
M þ uv
uþ T ð46Þ
up to an absolute expected error less than
Eð2α2α32 n; s; tÞEðqt M; T ;u; vÞ

¼ 2 ðn2 þ st2Þðn2 þ st2 þ 1Þðn2 þ st2 þ 2Þðn2 þ st2 þ 3ÞðN þ sÞðN þ sþ 1ÞðN þ sþ 2ÞðN þ sþ 3Þ
M þ uv
uþ T
ð47Þ5 We have two lines, each observed 12 years, with 8 single failures on either
line, and 3 failures occurring in both lines; whence, marginally, we observed 8
+32¼14 failures of a distribution line over a total timespan of 24 years.
6 In this simple example, we have no zero counts, so we can do with a lower
upper bound for s.6.2. Sensitivity analysis
As mentioned in Sections 4 and 5, due to epistemic uncertainty,
generally, an analyst speciﬁes bounds for the hyperparameters s, t,
u, and v. The parameter sets are, as before, denoted by H and J .
As we assumed qt and α to be independent (see Section 6.1), we
can separate the analysis into two simpler problems. We ﬁrst
calculate lower and upper bounds on the expectation of the terms
depending on α, based on the results from Sections 4 and 6.1.
Independently, we calculate lower and upper bounds on the
expectation of qt as we did in Section 5. These bounds uniquely
determine Eðqjjn;M; T ;H;J Þ and Eðqjjn;M; T ;H;J Þ, as follows.For convenience of notation, deﬁne
gjðαÞ≔
1
k−1
j−1
 ! jαj
∑kℓ ¼ 1ℓαℓ
: ð48Þ
Clearly, by Eq. (4),
qj ¼ gjðαÞqt ð49Þ
so,
Eðqjjn;M; T ;H;J Þ ¼ EðgjðαÞjn;HÞEðqt jM; T ;J Þ ð50Þ
where
EðgjðαÞjn;HÞ ¼ minðs;tÞ∈HEðgjðαÞjn; s; tÞ ð51Þ
Eðqt jM; T ;J Þ ¼ minðu;vÞ∈JEðqt jM; T ;u; vÞ ð52Þ
Similar expressions for the upper expectation hold as well by
simply replacing min by max at all instances. When using Taylor
approximation, an upper bound on the error term follows readily
as well (see example in Section 7).
As seen in Section 5, the optimization problem in Eq. (52) (and
its counterpart of the upper bound) can be done exactly, using Eqs.
(25) and (26). In contrast, the optimization problem in Eq. (51)
(and its counterpart of the upper bound) is not so obvious, and we
have to rely on standard numerical algorithms for non-linear
optimization. However, the particular form of H we assumed in
Section 4.2.2 (see Eq. (18)) makes this optimization problem fairly
easily solvable by computer.7. Example
To conclude the paper, we demonstrate our methodology on a
simple electrical network reliability problem. Numbers are ﬁc-
tional, yet are representative of a typical network in the North-East
of England.
A group of customers is supplied with power from two
identical distribution lines. Supply is lost when both lines fail.
Nationwide statistics show typical failure rate of similar distribu-
tion lines to be within 750% of 0.35 per year. Nationwide statistics
also show the typical fraction of double failures to be between 10%
and 20%. On the actual system under study, over the last 12 years,
11 failures were observed, 3 of which were double failures.
A typical quantity one would be interested in is q2 ¼ g2ðαÞqt , the
rate of double failures, as this is also the rate at which customers
lose power.
For the lower and upper expectation of qt, we take u¼3 (in years)
—this means that we need about 3 years of data before we start
moving away from our prior. For v, we take [0.175,0.525], that is all
values within 750% of the nationwide average 0.35. We ﬁnd5:
Eðqt jM; T ;J Þ ¼
14þ 3 0:175
24þ 3 ¼ 0:538 ð53Þ
Eðqt jM; T ;J Þ ¼
14þ 3 0:525
24þ 3 ¼ 0:577 ð54Þ
For the lower and upper expectation of g2ðαÞ, we take [1,4] for s,6
[0.8,0.9] for t1, and [0.1,0.2] for t2.
Our choice of s ¼ 4 means that after observing four single
failures (and no double failures), we are prepared to reduce the
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s ¼ 1 means that after observing one double failure (and no single
failures), we are prepared to reduce the prior lower fraction of
single failures (0.8) by half.
Then, using the 4th order Taylor approximation of g2ðαÞ as
explained in Section 6.1,
Eðg2ðαÞjn;HÞ ¼ minðs;tÞ∈HEðg2ðαÞjn; s; tÞ ð55Þ
≈min
ðs;tÞ∈H
2
n2 þ st2
N þ s 1−
n2 þ st2 þ 1
N þ sþ 1 1−
n2 þ st2 þ 2
N þ sþ 2

1−
n2 þ st2 þ 3
N þ sþ 3 1−
n2 þ st2 þ 4
N þ sþ 4
  
ð56Þ
¼ 0:360 ð57Þ
where N¼11, and n2 ¼ 3. A similar expression holds for
Eðg2ðαÞjn;HÞ; simply replace min by max:
Eðg2ðαÞjn;HÞ  0:410 ð58Þ
Both expressions for lower and upper expectation are accurate up
to the following absolute error:
max
ðs;tÞ∈H
2 ∏
5
p ¼ 0
n2 þ st2 þ p
N þ sþ p ¼ 0:006 ð59Þ
Concluding,
0:190¼ ð0:360−0:006Þ  0:538
≤Eðq2jn;M; T ;H;J Þ≤Eðq2jn;M; T ;H;J Þ
≤ð0:410þ 0:006Þ  0:577¼ 0:240 ð60Þ
or in other words, double failures occur at an expected rate that
lies between 0.19 and 0.24 per year.
A similar analysis for q1 yields:
0:318¼ ð0:595−0:003Þ  0:538
≤Eðq1jn;M; T ;H;J Þ≤Eðq1jn;M; T ;H;J Þ
≤ð0:643þ 0:003Þ  0:577¼ 0:373 ð61Þ
or in other words, single failures occur at an expected rate that lies
between 0.318 and 0.373 per year.
In this simple example with two redundant components,
posterior imprecision for the single failure rate is similar to the
posterior imprecision for the double failure rate. This is essentially
a special feature of the two component case, because it must hold
that α1 þ α2 ¼ 1 when k¼2. In case of larger k, the differences in
posterior imprecision between common-cause failure rates will be
considerably larger, as in the numerical examples of Section 4.2,
where, for instance, in case of Eq. (24), Eðαjjn;HÞ−Eðαjjn;HÞ ranges
from 0.001 to 0.011.8. Conclusion
We studied elicitation of hyperparameters for inferences that
arise in the alpha-factor representation of the basic parameter
model. For the hyperparameters of the Dirichlet prior for the
alpha-factors, we argued that bounds, rather than precise values,
are desirable, due to inferences being strongly sensitive to the
choice of prior distribution, particularly when faced with zero
counts. We concluded that assigning an interval for the learning
parameter is especially important. In doing so, we effectively
adapted the imprecise Dirichlet model [4] to represent epistemic
uncertainty in the alpha-factors.
For the marginal failure rate, the second part of the model, we
proposed a set of Gamma priors with similar properties as the set
of Dirichlet priors used for the alpha-factors. As zero counts are
generally not an issue for this part of the model, it may sufﬁce to
consider a ﬁxed learning parameter here.We identiﬁed simple ways to elicit information about the
hyperparameters, by reasoning on hypothetical data, rather than
by maximum entropy arguments as done in an earlier study [6,5]
on the estimation of alpha-factors. Essentially, the analyst needs to
specify how quickly he is willing to learn from various sorts of
hypothetical data.
Taking everything together, we arrived at a powerful procedure
for analyzing the inﬂuence of epistemic uncertainty on all
common-cause failure rates, the central quantities of interest in
the basic parameter model. As there is no immediate closed-form
solution for the expectation of these failure rates, we presented an
approximation based on Taylor expansion, and quantiﬁed the error
of the approximation at any order.
By allowing the analyst to specify bounds for all hyperpara-
meters, along with clear interpretations of these bounds, we
effectively provided an operational method for full sensitivity
analysis of common-cause failure rates, properly reﬂecting epis-
temic uncertainty of the analyst on all levels of the model. The
procedure was illustrated by means of a simple electrical network
example, demonstrating its feasibility and usefulness.
In the paper, we chose the sets of hyperparameters to be of a
very speciﬁc convex form (Eqs. (18) and (29)). This led to simple
calculations (at least for this problem), and made elicitation fairly
straightforward. Nevertheless, other shapes could still provide a
better ﬁt to any given epistemic information, and perhaps also
have better updating properties. Such shapes may, however, be
more difﬁcult to elicit. More general shapes for sets of Beta priors
are discussed in Walter et al. [16]. Already for Beta priors,
elicitation of these shapes is non-trivial, and provides an interest-
ing challenge. We leave a thorough study of such issues, for
Dirichlet and Gamma priors, to future work.
Another aspect we neglected in this paper is the calculation of
(imprecise) credible intervals – credible intervals are the Bayesian
equivalent of conﬁdence intervals, and allow us to judge the
uncertainty due to sample variability. Marginal credible intervals
on each component of α separately are reasonably easy to obtain
through the quantile function of the beta distribution [4, p. 18].
Concerning the actual quantity of interest, namely the vector q, we
note that the distribution of q, q being a rational function of α and
qt, is not easily tractable. A ﬁrst approach could be to approximate
the posterior distribution of q for ﬁxed ðs; t;u; vÞ∈H J by Monte
Carlo, that is, by random sampling from f ðαjn; s; tÞ and
f ðqt jM; T ;u; vÞ. We can then include epistemic uncertainty by con-
sidering a suitably constructed grid of ðs; t;u; vÞ values in H J . Of
course, this will be computationally quite expensive, so it would be
interesting to investigate other approximation procedures.Acknowledgments
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